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INTRODUCTION

An owner generally dictates the future of their property through conditions,
special limitations, trusts, and future interests.1 Issues arise, however, when
property owners exert unlimited posthumous control over such property to the
detriment of its heirs. As a result, courts have regularly limited the posthumous
control of an estate through the Rule Against Perpetuities2 and other similar
doctrines.
A recent movement towards the expansion of moral rights for artists
poses similar concerns of control. The Visual Artist’s Rights Act3 (“VARA”),
grants artists certain moral rights, defined as:
rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature that
exist independently of an artist's copyright in his or her work
and spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation
injects his spirit into the work and that the artist's personality,
as well as the integrity of the work, should therefore be
protected and preserved.4
This expansion of law threatens to increase the rights of a creator without
any thought to the interests of a subsequent owner.
In this Note, I argue that through VARA, Congress has haphazardly created
new rights without concern for traditional United States legal doctrine. Further,
these rights extend past the intended scope of intellectual property law and
restrict the liberty and creativity of any subsequent owner-artist. Specifically, I
am concerned about the creation of a legal tradition that subverts one artist’s
feelings over another artist’s creative liberty.5 As it stands, 17 U.S.C. § 106A
creates a moral right of integrity6 that is adverse to both traditional ownership
doctrines and the Constitution. The circumstances Congress sought to remedy
through VARA have been adequately addressed through remedial doctrines in
contract, tort, and the breadth of intellectual property law.
The crux of my argument lies in constitutional concerns regarding both due
process under the Fifth Amendment and freedom of expression under the First
LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND, 32-36 (1955).
Rule Against Perpetuities, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“No later than 21 years
(plus a period of gestation to cover a posthumous birth) after the death of some person alive
when the interest was created.”).
3 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
4 Urbain Pottier v. Hotel Plaza Las Delicias, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 130, 132 (D.P.R. 2019)
(quoting Rivera v. Mendez & Co., 824 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (D.P.R.)).
5 I analogize these circumstances with a similar concern of a testator’s unchecked posthumous
control of their property as explained by the Dead Hand Theory and addressed by the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
6 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
1
2
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Amendment. Specifically, I seek to show the grave implications that arise under
VARA when an artist seeks to creatively destroy a work they own and
unintentionally violates one’s integrity. As a result, I call for an exemption to
VARA for the destruction and creative rebirth of a work of art (“Creative
Destruction”). I argue that destruction is a cornerstone of creativity, and any
legislation limiting such creativity directly conflicts with the powers delegated to
Congress in the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, in addition to
both the First and Fifth Amendments.
First, I explain Creative Destruction and its place in art and creative
development. Then, through a quick art history lesson, I show the underlying
lines of destruction that flow through both artistic movements and works
themselves. This section emphasizes the importance of destruction in the
creative cycle and how the regulation of integrity may negatively affect it.
Next, I provide background on the relevant statutory and common law
authorities, as well as an explanation of some legal principles discussed later in
the Note. Also, I emphasize the strong public policy in favor of protecting
destruction as a form of modern art. Finally, I close the section with a discussion
of destruction’s current role in both American and European art.
After developing the legal and social backgrounds concerning my argument,
I begin my analysis with the consideration of remedial principles existing in law
before VARA’s enaction. These principles satisfy both constitutional and
international concerns, while also providing protection specifically tailored to the
United States.
Then, I will present an applied constitutional challenge showing that
Congress acted outside of its scope through adopting the moral right of integrity.
First, I explain how integrity poses a grave threat to a subsequent owner-artist’s
due process. Consequently, this also threatens to violate a subsequent ownerartist’s First Amendment7 rights and ultimately contravenes the scope of the
powers conferred in the Copyright Clause.8
Finally, I provide solutions advocating for the legal protection of destruction
as a creative process. This involves a balancing of interests and the provision of
an exemption for creative destruction. Also, the Visual Artists Rights Act must
be updated to satisfy the requirements of Due Process. This can be done through
conditioning action on its registration or the receipt of notice.

7
8

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

The term “Creative Destruction” originated in economics as a theory
proffered by Joseph Schumpeter, a political economist.9 This theory maintains
that the core of capitalist progression is the evolution and the continual
revolution of goods from within.10 At its core, Creative Destruction seeks a
sustainable path towards innovation and creation.11 Further, some scholars argue
that creative destruction could be one of the biggest opportunities for a
business’s success in the history of commerce.12 In light of its relevance and
acknowledgment in the economic community, the application of Creative
Destruction to artwork and its consumer market is a reasonable conclusion.
A famous example of Creative Destruction and its application to art hangs in
the San Francisco Museum of Art and is entitled “Erased de Kooning Drawing”
by Robert Rauschenberg.13 As the title suggests, this piece was a Willem de
Kooning sketch that had been erased by Rauschenberg over the period of a
month.14
Rauschenberg’s usual account of Erased de Kooning Drawing’s
origins begins with a simple challenge: he wanted to discover a
way to make a drawing with an eraser. He had tried erasing one
of his own drawings but found the results lacking. He became
convinced that the only way to create a work of art through
erasure would be to start with a drawing by an artist of
universally recognized significance. His first and only choice
was Willem de Kooning (1904–1997), a painter at the apex of

Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction 1 (NBER
Working
Paper
Series,
No.
3223,
1990),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w3223/w3223.pdf.
10 See id. (detailing that “[o]bsolescence does not fit well into existing models of endogenous
growth.”).
11 Stuart L. Hart & Mark B. Milstein, Global Sustainability and the Creative Destruction of Industries,
SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Oct. 25, 1999), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/global-sustainabilityand-the-creative-destruction-of-industries/.
12 id. at 25.
13 Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, S.F. MUSEUM MOD. ART (1953),
https://www.sfmoma.org/artwork/98.298/.
14 Preminda Jacob, Banksy and the Tradition of Destroying Art, CNN STYLE (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/style/article/banksy-tradition-of-destroying-art/index.html.
9
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his powers who had recently reached the highest echelons of
the New York art world.15
Thankfully for Rauschenberg, when acquiring this sketch, he disclosed his
intentions to de Kooning, to which de Kooning consented.16 As a result, he likely
would not have a strong VARA suit for the destruction and infringement on his
right of moral integrity.17
1. Examples.
The contemporary art movement brings forth a great opportunity for an
interest in destructive art. One of the most prominent current forms of such
destruction is the graffiti art movement. 18 This movement “has its origins in
1970s New York, when young people began to use spray paint and other
materials to create images on buildings.”19 At its core, the graffiti art movement
is disruptive to public spaces, and in most cases, illegal.20 This disruption,
however, is not a threat to the public and oftentimes poses opportunities for
necessary social dialogue and change in communities.21
An example of graffiti art is shown through the Cabbagetown Community in
Atlanta, Georgia and the Krog Street tunnel located therein.22 As the city’s
population expanded in the 2000’s, however, the community saw an influx of
Sarah Roberts, Erased de Kooning Drawing, S.F. MUSEUM OF MOD. ART (July 2013),
https://www.sfmoma.org/essay/erased-de-kooning-drawing/.
16 Rauschenberg, supra note 13.
17 It is worth noting that this sketch was created in 1953, thus pre-dating the Visual Artists
Rights Act. As a result, an actual VARA claim based on these circumstances deserves a more
in-depth analysis that is beyond the scope of this note. In its relevant part, 17 U.S.C. §
106A(d)(2) states
15

[w]ith respect to works of visual art created before the effective date set
forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 . . . the
rights conferred by subsection (a) shall be coextensive with, and shall
expire at the same time as, the rights conferred by section 106.
18 Graffiti Art, TATE, https://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/g/graffiti-art (last visited Oct. 13,
2021).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 145.60 (“No person shall make graffiti of any type on any building,
public or private, or any other property real or personal owned by any person, firm or
corporation or any public agency or instrumentality, without the express permission of the
owner or operator of said property.”).
21 Lu Olivero, Graffiti Is a Public Good, Even As It Challenges the Law, N.Y. TIMES, (July 11, 2014,
6:15 PM) https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/07/11/when-does-graffitibecome-art/graffiti-is-a-public-good-even-as-it-challenges-the-law.
22 Becca J G Godwin, We Read All the Google Reviews of Krog Street Tunnel. It’s Weird, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/read-all-the-google-reviews-krogstreet-tunnel-weird/e9KsmzItB2jqCkpead9fnJ/.
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residents and, likewise, the gentrification of both its infrastructure and
community.23 A significant byproduct of this gentrification is the change in
dialogue between life-long residents and artists and the competing interests of
new residents and developers.24
Specifically, in 2014, a group of local artists painted over the iconic graffiti of
the Krog Street tunnel to protest a private party to be held there.25 The party
organizer was accused of “swooping in to make money off public space and
public art.”26 A resident commented on the situation saying, “It’s one thing for
a neighborhood to embrace something that is their own . . . It’s another thing
for an outsider to come in with something that is quintessentially for profit.”27
Painting over community artwork was an act of both performance and graffiti
art, seeking to comment on the unjust appropriation of the community.28
Through the act of destruction, the artists were able to voice their opinion that
no outsider will profit off their work without credit or long-term interest in the
community.29
Destructive works also find recognition in Japan, as a form of reverence for
the piece itself,30 and in France, as a form of performative commentary.31 The
Japanese example of Kintsugi focuses on the cycle of the physical piece itself.32
Alternatively, the French example of destruction represents a social commentary
on the ideals of art and what constitutes museum-quality work.33 Both practices
demonstrate the necessity of destruction as a way to creatively communicate an
artist’s viewpoint.

A
Brief
History
of
Cabbagetown,
Atlanta,
CABBAGETOWN,
https://cabbagetown.com/history (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
24 Id. (showing the change from a working Mill town to a more urban environment including
restaurants, lofts, and a diverse community).
25 Artists Paint Over Krog Street Tunnel Graffiti in Protest Over Party, WSB-TV (Oct. 23, 2014, 12:28
PM EDT), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/grafitti-art-painted-over-well-knownatlanta-tunne/137252250/.
26 Id.
27 Id. (quoting Nathan Bolster, a community resident and photographer).
28 Rhonda Cook, Graffiti Artists Paint Over Their Work in Krog Street Tunnel Protest, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Oct. 23, 2014) https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/graffiti-artists-paintover-their-work-krog-street-tunnel-protest/VMZdLiSejrN9RFOuCnc7cP/.
29 Id.
30 See Anonoymous, Kintsugi++, 34, 4 ISSUES SCI. AND TECH. 55, 55 (Summer 2018), available
at:
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2177532016/fulltextPDF/FF96694D4376440FPQ/2
0?accountid=147007 (“As a philosophy it treats breakage as part of the object’s history rather
than as an error or a failure to be covered up or discarded.”)
31 Riding, infra note 36.
32 Id.
33 Riding, infra note 41.
23
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The Japanese practice of Kintsugi finds beauty in the resurrection of broken
pottery.34 Kintsugi is a transformative process that mends accidentally broken
pottery at its seams with gold lacquer.35 Kintsugi emphasizes the life cycle of
artwork and believes that its repair and mending is a meaningful and significant
addition to the work itself.36
While Kintsugi is a practice grounded in repairing accidentally broken art,
there seems to be little difference between its philosophies and creative
destruction. All artwork has a cycle, and upon its physical destruction, the piece
will gain a new meaning once more. In other words, the significance of this art
is in the work itself and not its physical manifestation.
In France, destructive art makes more of a statement. Notwithstanding the
vast protection of moral rights, French artists find ways to express destructive
creativity and tempt their legal fate in the name of art. A significant French work
of destruction is found in the story of Marcel Duchamp’s work entitled
“Fountain.”37 This work was a replica of a urinal and signed by Duchamp under
the pseudonym “R. Mutt.”38 The piece itself is a part of the artistic movement of
readymades.39 This movement involved artists, who created pieces out of
everyday objects.40 Here, the everyday object was a urinal.
While the piece itself has a certain narrative and impact as intended by
Duchamp, it took on a life of its own after its creation. In 1993, French
performance artist, Pierre Pinoncelli, took a hammer to the Fountain.41 As a result,
Pinoncelli was incarcerated and subjected to a fine.42 His attack “refocuses

Kelly Richman-Abdou, Kintsugi: The Centuries-Old Art of Repairing Broken Pottery with Gold, MY
MODERN MET (Sept. 5, 2019), https://mymodernmet.com/kintsugi-kintsukuroi/.
35 Id.
36 Richman-Abdou notes:
34

In addition to serving as an aesthetic principle, Kintsugi has long
represented prevalent philosophical ideas. Namely, the practice is related
to the Japanese philosophy of wabi-sabi, which calls for seeing beauty in
the flawed or imperfect. The repair method was also born from the
Japanese feeling of mottainai, which expresses regret when something is
wasted, as well as mushin, the acceptance of change.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Sophie Howarth & Jennifer Mundy, Marcel Duchamp Fountain 1917, Replica 1964, TATE,
https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-t07573 (last updated Aug. 2015).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Alan Riding, Conceptual Artist as Vandal: Walk Tall and Carry a Little Hammer (or Ax), N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/arts/design/conceptual-artistas-vandal-walk-tall-and-carry-a-little-hammer.html.
42 Id.
37
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attention on the perennial question of what defines art.”43 Pinoncelli intended
his actions to rescue the Fountain from elitism and “restore it to its original use
as a urinal.”44 Pinoncelli references to the Fountain’s infancy, a time where its
purpose was to comment on the superiority of art and push against classical art
values.45 Pinoncelli's public destruction attempts to revert the Fountain from its
current status as a fixture on a pedestal in important museums to its original
purpose of social commentary.46
The Fountain “tested beliefs about art and the role of taste in the art world . .
. .”47 Duchamp stated the work had been chosen “in part because he thought it
had the least chance of being liked . . . .”48 The work itself and its dramatic
backstory are examples of modern movements and the “questioning of the
structures of belief and value associated with the concept of art.”49 Regardless of
its originally intended meaning, the Fountain’s destruction represents a movement
in art away from tradition and towards more performative and conceptual work.
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. Common-Law Ownership of Property.
A property owner is granted the right to possess, use, and convey their
property.50 One’s personal property consists of “[a]ny movable or intangible
thing . . . subject to ownership and not classified as real property.”51 Under this
basic understanding of ownership rights, one should be able to do as they please
with their personal property; albeit subject to restrictions generally regarding
waste,52 public policy,53 and law.54 A large percentage of the time, an owner has
absolute ownership over their personal property.

Id.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Howarth & Mundy, supra note 37.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
51 Personal Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
52 In re Estate of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492-93 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (finding a testator’s provision
for the razing of their home as “immoral, a waste, [and] against public policy . . .”).
53 Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that
“senseless destruction serving no apparent good purpose is to be held in disfavor. A wellordered society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources when such acts directly
affect important interests of other members of that society.”)
54 See e.g., Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (discussing
government takings which limits personal property rights for government use in certain
circumstances).
43
44
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In the United States, property owners have wide discretion in governing their
property through a bundle of rights, including “the right to possess and use, the
right to exclude, and the right to transfer.”55 Until the 20th century, the right to
destroy existed under the radar.56 While it has not been outright disclaimed, the
right to destroy is not explicitly protected by either common law or statute. Thus,
it follows that inherently within an owner’s absolute dominion over their
possessions lies the opportunity for destruction.
2. Consumer Protection.
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) governs a majority of United States
jurisdictions, and most forms of art are goods under the U.C.C.57 The U.C.C. is
the result of a comprehensive push towards uniformity in commercial
transactions.58 The Code itself is advisory in authority; however, as of today, only
Louisiana and Puerto Rico have failed to enact any U.C.C. provision.59 While the
U.C.C. is incredibly influential in state courts, it is important to remember that
copyrights are governed under federal law and state law is likely preempted in
those circumstances.60
Under U.C.C. Article 2 regarding the sale of goods, a consumer of a
commercial product is afforded protection against misrepresentation and fraud.61
A “good” is defined as “all things (including specially manufactured goods)

Property, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 794 (2005) (emphasizing
how “few scholars had devoted much attention to the right to destroy, while a great deal of
attention has been lavished on some of the other property rights . . . [such as] the right to
exclude, the right to alienate, the right to use, the right to testamentary disposition, the right
to mortgage, and the like.”).
57
See
Uniform
Commercial
Code,
THE
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/ucc#:~:text=The%20Uniform%20Commercial%20Co
de%20(UCC,the%20interstate%20transaction%20of%20business (last visited Sept. 28, 2021)
(“The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a comprehensive set of laws governing all
commercial transactions in the United States. It is not a federal law, but a uniformly adopted
state law. Uniformity of law is essential in this area for the interstate transaction of business.”).
58 Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/ucc (last visited Nov. 21,
2021).
59 Id.
60 See 1844. Copyright Law – Preemption of State Law, DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1844-copyright-lawpreemption-state-law (citing Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225-1226 (11th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984))(setting forth a preemption test wherein the “states are
precluded from enforcing penalties for copyright violations if the intellectual property at issue
falls within the ‘subject matter of copyright’ as defined by federal law and if the claimed
property rights are ‘equivalent to’ the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law.”)
61 U.C.C. § 2-102.
55
56
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which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than
the money in which the price is to be paid.”62
For any recognized good, the U.C.C. provides consumer protection
through implied warranties.63 Such implied warranties are either of fitness or
merchantability.64 These warranties largely concern a consumer’s expectations as
relied on upon through the merchant’s marketing.65
3. State and Federal Legislation.
Many states protect against the destruction of artwork through historical
preservation statutes.66 This protection is likely a reflection of the localized
emphasis on artistic culture and creation.67 While an analysis of state law is
important for a complete view of artwork protection, federal law ultimately
preempts any such state-level protection.68 Until the Visual Artists Rights Act,
these individual state laws were the only form of moral rights protection in the
United States.
The United States inherited a statutory system of intellectual property rights
from England that functioned without any specific articulation of moral rights
for artists.69 Legal tradition also shows an absence of a need for moral rights
protection and a system without binding precedent on the matter. Discussed
below are relevant federal statutes applicable to artwork, specifically legislation
governing trademark and copyright as codified through the Lanham Act70 and
the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976.71
U.C.C. § 2-105..
U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 N. MEX. STAT. §§ 18-8-1—19-8-8 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-8-501 (1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 53, §§ 1.1-5.3 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2714 (2010).
67 California and New York, two major hubs of creativity, have legislated for the increased
protection of those interests, but these state statutes are ultimately preempted by federal law.
California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1994); Authorship Rights Act,
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1995). See also 11 other states with moral
right legislation: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-116(2012), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151 to
51:2156 (2012), ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 27, § 303 (2011), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 85S (2012),
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 597.720, 730, 740, 750, 760 (2011), N.J. STAT., ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to
2A:24A-8 (West 2013), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4b-1 to 13-4b-3 (2012), 73 PA STAT. ANN. §§
2101-2110 (West 2012), and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-8 (2012).
68 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (establishing the Supremacy Clause which provides that the
federal constitution, and federal law, generally takes precedent over state laws and even
sometimes state constitutions).
69 United States Copyright Office, Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in the
COPYRIGHT
OFF.,
9–25
(Apr.
2019),
United
States,
U.S.
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/full-report.pdf.
70 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
71 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1909) and amended in (1976).
62
63
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The Lanham Act is a federal law protecting trademarks. Trademarks exist for
consumer protection and to protect against the use by others of words or
symbols in connection with the sale of goods or services when such use is likely
to mislead consumers.72 The Lanham Act protects an individual’s “goods,
services, or commercial activities [used in commerce] by another person . . . .”73
The Act further requires distinctiveness and provides greater protection to artists
with unique styles rather than artists with common styles.74
To bring a viable claim for trade dress infringement75 a “mark” must be
“distinctive.”76 A mark may be either inherently distinctive or have acquired a
secondary meaning.77 Section 43(a) provides civil liability for
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which- (A)is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services or commercial activities by another person. . .
.78
Artwork can fall under almost all of these categories of trademark, and at the
very least can be described as “any combination thereof.”79 Further, “[t]o
be protected, a mark must be distinctive, that is, capable of distinguishing the
product on which it used from those of others, either because it is inherently
distinctive, or if merely descriptive has acquired distinctiveness through

Michelle Brownlee, Note, Safeguarding Style: What Protection is Afforded to Visual Artists by the
Copyright and Trademark Laws?, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1171 (1993).
73 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
74 Id.
75 See Linda Stevens & Mark S. VanderBroek, Protecting and Enforcing Trade Dress, A.B.A.
1 (Oct. 14–16, 2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/franchising/2009/w7.pdf
(“‘[T]rade dress’ means the overall appearance or image of something in commerce — how
it is ‘dressed’ for sale.”).
76 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (stating that “[o]nly
nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under § 43(a)”).
77 Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int’l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
78 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (emphasis added).
79 Id.
72
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secondary meaning.”80 Again, artwork, in every media, easily falls into this
description.
A work of art can also receive trademark protection through its association
with a good, service, or business to acquire secondary meaning.81 Thus, an artist
wishing to be recognized by law can do so by creating a business entity under
which they sell their art. This satisfies the objective criteria of acquiring a
secondary meaning.82 Further, by cultivating a “distinct” style, the artist reaffirms
the connection between their style and authorship of a particular work. Thus, an
artist who sincerely wishes to protect and profit off of their art must undergo the
requisite steps to do so, as other professionals do in their respective practices.
Issues may arise when an artist can claim protection under both the Copyright
Act and the Lanham Act. This may preclude a trademark claim; however, the
Copyright Act does not preempt the Lanham Act.83 Instead, courts may opt to
favor copyright protection over fears of inhibiting artistic discourse.84 This is best
exemplified in an allegation of trade dress infringement brought by the infamous
Salvador Dali.85
There, the court dismissed the claim because the subject matter at issue was
preempted by copyright; the case, however, is still an interesting study into
whether trademark protection could be afforded to an aggrieved artist.86 The
artwork in question were works similar in style to artist Salvador Dali.87 Dali’s
argument alleged that trade dress consisted of:
the particular lines, unique figural constellation, colors, stylistic
features and design of a certain subject in an image created by
Dali... Thus, it is not Dali's signature that sets his artwork apart
from similar creations by other artists, but rather his unique
style and interpretation of a certain subject as expressed on
paper.88
Mark Traphagen, Stretching the Canvas Protection of Visual Artistic Styles in Works of Fine Art
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 10 ENT. & SPORTS L., 3, 4 (1992).
81 Id.
82 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“However, descriptive
marks may acquire the distinctiveness which will allow them to be protected under the Act.
Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides that a descriptive mark that otherwise could not be
registered under the Act may be registered if it ‘has become distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce.’”) (quoting Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052 (e), (f)).
83 Id. at 5–6.
84 Id.
85 Galerie Fürstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
86 Id. at 1290 (stating that the trade dress argument “endeavors to enforce what is at best a
copyright claim through the mechanism of trademark protection.”) (citation omitted).
87 Id. at 1285 (“defendants created counterfeit versions of Dali's artwork by (1) reproducing a
Dali work so it would appear to have an authorship it lacks...”)
88 Id. at 1289-90.
80
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Here, while the court is hesitant to utilize all of their legal weapons in the
intellectual property law toolbox, they ultimately decide based on a stronger
argument “better suited for decision under the Copyright Act.”89
The Copyright Act is a federal statute that details the exclusive rights inherent
in copyright ownership, the rights to reproduce, make derivative works,
distribute copies, publicly perform, publicly display, and to transmit digital
audio.90 These rights continue for a specific term of years, as infinite protection
is not required to achieve the goals intended by the Patent and Copyright
Clause.91 The current version of the Copyright Act92 is “the result of a careful,
exhaustive legislative effort and compromise that seeks to balance the various
competing interests of economic groups, authors, artists, and as well as to serve
the general public interest.”93
The 1976 Act contains fundamental improvements upon its 1909 ancestor.
First, the 1976 Act extended the term of statutory protection from a “maximum
term of 56 years to the life of the author plus 70 years.”94 Additionally, “[t]he
‘manufacturing clause’ appearing in section 16 of the 1909 Act . . . has been
phased out.”95 This means that a copyrighted work is not preconditioned on its
physical printing. Further, “[t]he judicial doctrine of ‘fair use’ has been codified
in section 107,” allowing for “[m]ore latitude [to be] given to second users who
create transformative works and/or parody.”96
When the United States became a member of the Berne Convention97 in
1988, it became apparent Congress needed to amend the Copyright Act to find
a source for Berne rights.98 This resulted in VARA which brought “United States

Traphagen, supra note 80, at 6.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
91 See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Beat Should Not Go On: Resisting Early Calls for Further Extensions
of Copyright Duration, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 783, 789 (“In stating that the ‘exclusive right[s]’
granted to creators must be for ‘limited times,’ the Framers envisioned the existence of a rich
public domain made up of works whose copyrights had expired. The public would be free to
borrow without restriction from public domain works and to use those works as the
foundations of new creative endeavors.").
92 Id.
93 The Copyright Act of 1976, 4 WEST'S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 4001 (2021).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (“The Berne
Convention, adopted in 1886, deals with the protection of works and the rights of their
authors. It provides creators such as authors, musicians, poets, painters etc. with the means to
control how their works are used, by whom, and on what terms.”).
98 Id.
89
90
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law into conformance with the . . . [t]ext of the Convention.”99 As discussed next,
VARA confers authors of works of visual art certain moral rights in their work.
C. THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT 1990

In 1990, Congress promulgated legislation protecting the moral rights of
attribution and integrity under the Visual Artists Rights Act.100 Facially, VARA
appears as part of the United States’ compliance with the Berne Convention;
however, as evidenced by its name, the Visual Artists Rights Act only protects
the narrow category of visual art.101 International standards under the Berne
Convention protect an array of artistic works, including literature, music, visual
art, and expression.102 In contrast, Congress’ sole compliance with the Berne
Convention was through its granting of moral rights to the author of visual
work.103
The right of attribution gives an artist the right of authorship to their work.104
This right, in my opinion, does not threaten the constitution or individual rights
and need not be exhaustively discussed for this Note.105 Conversely, the moral
right of integrity is where Congress crosses the line to paternalistic monitoring
of the subsequent owner’s use of rightfully owned property.
1. The Right of Attribution.
Unlike the right of integrity, attribution causes no harm to a subsequent
owner. Attribution is simply the right to claim or disclaim an artwork as one’s
creation.106 Authorship does not purport to restrict any action and seeks to

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 106A.
101 17 U.S.C. § 101 (specifying that “a work of visual art” consists solely of “a painting, drawing,
print, sculpture” or “still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only”, and
specifically excludes “poster[s], map[s], globe[s], chart[s]”, as well as “any work made for hire”
and works not protected by copyright.)
102 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(1), Sept. 9, 1886,
revised at Paris July 24, 1971 and amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)
(protecting “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be
the mode or form of its expression.”).
103 17 U.S.C. § 106A (representing the only section of the Code providing moral rights for
creative works).
104 Id. § 106A(a).
105 The Right of Attribution is set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) as “the author of a work of
visual art (1) shall have the right (A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the
use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create;(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work
of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”
106 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
99

100
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protect both consumers and artists from the spread of misinformation as to the
validity of the work itself.107 As a result, the right of attribution does not
necessarily create a new right for artists but merely codifies one that already
existed.108 In this Note, I refrain from arguing for any sort of restrictions on the
moral right of attribution as it is harmless to any subsequent owner or consumer
and does not affect creative destruction.
2. The Right of Integrity.
Subject to limited exceptions,109 VARA grants artists the right to prevent
distortion, mutilation, or any modification to their work that may be prejudicial
to their honor or reputation.110 Further, VARA states that any “intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.”111
This legislation broadly grants rights of control to the original artist without
balancing other interests—specifically, that of the subsequent owner-artist. The
right of integrity “concerns the prerogative of artists to protect their works from
distortion, mutilation, transformation, or alteration without their consent, even
if the artist no longer owns the work.”112 This is likely reflective of, and derivative
from, the cultural appreciation of artwork in France.113 In France, “[a] work of
art is not merely an item that the artist sells, but an ‘expression of his innermost
being.’”114
Further, VARA allows for the continuance of such rights regardless of
transfer in ownership, unless expressly waived by the author in a written
instrument.115 Together, these provisions create a framework of protection

Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 132–33 (1997).
108 See id. (“The right of attribution gives an artist the capacity to insist that [their name be
associated with their works] . . . by effectively imposing and enforcing a servitude on her work
to that effect.”).
109 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) holds limited exceptions for cases in which “(A) a work of visual art
has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such a way that removing the work
from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), and (B) the author consented to the installation
of the work in the building either before the effective date set forth in section 610(a) . . . or in
a written instrument executed on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of
the building and the author that specified that installation of the work may subject the work
to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its removal.”
110 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
111 Id.
112 JUDITH B. PROWDA ET AL., VISUAL ARTS AND THE LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR PROFESSIONALS
104 (2013).
113 Swack, infra note 164.
114 Id. at 101.
115 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2).
107
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surrounding the artist and their work while simultaneously neglecting any
subsequent owner’s interests and understanding of their purchase.116
The United States ratified the Berne Convention in 1988, after years of debate
in Congress, by passing the Berne Convention Implementation Act.117 The
Visual Artists Rights Act was “greatly motivated by [the United States’] interest
in protecting other forms of intellectual property overseas, especially computer
software, which was subject to piracy.”118 Ultimately, to ensure compliance with
the Berne Convention and secure protection for computer software, “the US
would need to enact federal legislation granting moral rights to artists.”119
D. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE BERNE CONVENTION

The World Trade Organization has many agreements that govern the trade
of goods, services, and, particularly relevant here, intellectual property.120 Of
these agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights or (TRIPS) relate to
artwork. Specifically, TRIPS sets minimum standards for the regulation of
different forms of intellectual property.121 TRIPS was a result of the inadequacy
of GATT to properly protect certain intellectual property rights.122 Like almost
every agreement mentioned, these standards are also subject to the discretion of
the various nations participating in the agreement.123
Section 1 details TRIPS’ role concerning the Berne Convention and states:
[(1)] Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the
Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However,
Members shall not have rights or obligations under this
This brings very interesting implications in contract surrounding an unfair balance of
bargaining power in favor of the artist, reliance on part of the purchaser, and various unfair
contracting practices. Further, as an object of commerce, this implicates potential implied
warranties.
117 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
118 PROWDA ET AL., supra note 112, at 109.
119 Id.
120 The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
121
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2021).
122 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
300 [hereinafter TRIPS] (detailing its purpose and goals as a desire to reduce impediments to
international trade, and to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property
rights).
123 Id. at art. 1 (explaining that “[m]embers may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their
law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”).
116
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Agreement in respect to rights conferred under Article 6bis of
the Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.124
Further, TRIPS is only limited in copyright by “limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder.”125 This agreement is overwhelmingly geared
towards the pharmaceutical sector.126 Understandably, widespread and
international trade agreements concerning intellectual property are
overwhelmingly geared towards application in technology and
pharmaceuticals.127 However, because art is an inherently unique intersection of
competing interests—most notably the underscored consumer—it is not fitting
to govern a work solely from the scope of the artist’s interests. Instead, one must
take into account the totality of pre-existing agreements, like TRIPS, governing
intellectual property to synthesize a totality of protection.
Responding to the need for internationally expanded copyright protection,
the Berne Convention proposed a framework of protection and called for
international support and compliance with its minimum provisions.128 This
Convention was held in 1988 with the intent to protect the rights of authors in
their literary and artistic works.129 It provided this copyright protection to a broad
array of works “ranging from conventional works—such as books, motion
pictures, and music—to new tech-nological works, including video cassettes and
computer-related software.”130 The major provisions of the Berne Convention
show an intent to spread a blanket, automatic protection over the totality of an
author’s creations.
This practice furthers a general framework for the ideal protection of art from
the sole perspective of the artist. The Convention fails to take into account any
alternative interest of the consumer. The individual who purchases the piece
becomes the “economic owner” with an independent,131 yet equally important
interest in the artwork.
124 TRIPS, supra note 122, at 304 (stating that “[c]opyright protection shall extend to expression

and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation, or mathematical concepts as such.”).
Id. at 305.
126 Id.
127 See Pharmaceutical Patents and the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 21, 2006),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm (discussing the
TRIPS agreement and its relation to pharmaceutical inventions).
128 Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html (last
visited Nov. 21, 2021).
129 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 101), at 2.
130 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 1602 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2021).
131 Id.
125
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E. INTEGRITY

1. The French “droit moral.”
The right of integrity has its roots in the French doctrine of Droite Moral.
Droite Moral is grounded in the belief of a natural right of property.132 Initially,
philosophers Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel focused on
the written word as a basis for moral rights.133 Kant believed that personality
rights were imbued in every man and were inherently conveyed through the
artist’s works.134 Later, scholars expanded upon the philosophies of Kant and
Hegel to form the base for the modern droite moral.135 While European scholars
pondered the application of moral rights to artistic expression, the United States
had yet to codify copyright protection.136
In reviewing these philosophies, there is an interesting conflation of literary
and visual works of art. As discussed above, Kant’s theories mainly focused on
literary works and are not immediately applicable to visual art without further
discussion.137 In the early 20th century, it seems like this conflation remained.
Joseph Kohler created the dualist theory of author’s rights directly from Hegel’s
philosophies, which stated that artists held both personal and economic interests
in their work with each being protected under different categories of legal
rights.138 While this specific distinction between “artist” and “author” in early
philosophies may be arbitrary, it is important to note their differences—
especially in the context of creating more stringent protection for a whole class
of work. The expansion and potential resolution of this discrepancy between
artist and author has been fleshed out through centuries of French case law to
assume protection over both.
In 1852, an upper court in Paris reversed a previous decision in favor of an
artist for an award of criminal sanctions resultant from mutilation of the artist’s

Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States
and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1994) (“United States
copyright law has been molded principally by classical utilitarianism . . . Continental copyright
law, on the other hand, is a combination of natural rights and German idealism.”).
133 Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights
and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 839, 841 (1990).
134 Netanel, supra note 132, at 17.
135 Id. at 20 (In the latter half of the 19th Century, Karl Gareis, Otto Freidrich von Gierke, and
Josef Kohler expanded describing the philosophies of Kant and Hegel as the theoretical bases
of moral rights).
136 Id. at 7, 21 (The United States Copyright Act was promulgated in 1976, about 100 years
later than the scholars mentioned above).
137 Id. at 17 n. 67 (discussing Kant’s distinction “which he categorized as action (‘opera’), or
an exercise of the author's powers, and works of art, which he depicted as corporeal objects
(‘opus’) that are beyond the ambit of copyright protection”).
138 Id. at 22.
132
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sculpture.139 While the court ultimately ruled against the artist, the opinion
recognized the deeply personal nature of an artist’s connection to their
artwork.140 There, a subsequent owner mutilated their statute created by the
artist.141 The court reversed their finding of criminal sanctions for the mutilation,
stating that criminal proceedings had been inappropriate for the mutilation of
artwork but left open a possibility of civil remedies.142
Over twenty years later, French jurist, Andre Morillot, became the first
person to knowingly use the phrase “droite moral” in a case before France’s
highest court.143 That case decided a niche issue of whether the property rights
inherent in copyright were community property between spouses.144 The court
held that copyright was community property but allowed the painter-husband to
“retain[] his right to change the works or even ‘suppress’ them.”145 This doctrine
of droite moral over many years has evolved and merged into the moral rights
of attribution and integrity protected by The Berne Convention.146 However,
these rights became extremely watered down as a result of differences in society
and law.147
2. U.S. Approach Moral Rights.
Moral rights in the United States find their origins directly in the Berne
Convention.148 Although now formally a part of the Berne Convention, the
United States has been slower to previously accept moral rights into a doctrine
as extensively as its international colleagues.149 To date, VARA protects an artist’s
rights of integrity and attribution but fails to achieve the level of protection
desired by the Berne Convention.150 The United States has been hesitant to adopt
Dalloz jurisprudence générale, recueil périodique et critique, 1852 [D.P.] II.159.
Id.
141 Clésinger et Laneuville c. Gauvin, Trib. corr. de Paris, 5 janvier 1850, Dalloz jurisprudence
générale, recueil périodique et critique, 1850 [D.P.] III.14.
142 Dalloz jurisprudence générale, recueil périodique et critique, 1852 [D.P.] II.159.
143 Civ. Cass, 25 juin 1902 (Cinquin c. Lecocq) : Dalloz jurisprudence générale, recueil
périodique et critique, 1903 [D.P.] 1.5.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 United States Copyright Office, Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in
the United States, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 6 (Apr. 2019)
147 I say “watered down” because by the time the United States officially adopted these moral
rights, the rights themselves had to conform to United States precedent in order to be fully
embraced. This is evidenced by United States reluctance to formally adopt Berne Convention
provisions. Infra section (e)2.
148 Berne Convention, supra note 129.
149 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 130, at 750 (“The United States ha[d] not adhered to the Berne
Convention because of differences of certain copyright principles . . . The United States, the
Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China are the only major countries that are not
parties to the convention.”).
150 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
139
140
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moral rights because compliance with the Berne Convention concerns
differences in the requirements for “copyright formalities such as notice and
registration.”151 These formal requirements of notice and registration both
protect the consumer.
First, notice is fundamental to the due process rights of the consumer—
without notice of liability a subsequent owner does not know what they can and
can’t do with the physical work. Further, the traditional copyright requirement
of registration serves to provide such a notice that allows a prudent buyer to
understand the extent of their liability.152 The broad conferral of protection
granted by the Convention sans notice or registration is not in line with the
United States’ more traditional approach that grants conditional protections only
if the author requests it via legal action. Absent this action, protection will not
be conferred, reflecting the United States’ practice of conservatively granting
individual rights.153
Further, moral rights recognize two complete and concurrent interests in
property, breaking the sanctity of traditional property ownership.154
Traditionally, the United States transfers complete ownership upon transfer of
title.155 With the implementation of VARA, a complete, new, independent, and
potentially adverse interest is given to the creator that undermines conveyance
of the traditional total transfer of property rights to the art owner.156
The Convention mandates automatic protection, that is, protection inherent
within the artists’ authorship of the work itself.157 By creating a work that falls
within Berne protection, an artist is entitled to such protection, regardless of
Id.
United States Copyright Office, Recordation of Transfers and Other Documents, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF. 2 (2016), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ12.pdf (“Recordation of a document in
the Office may provide the advantage of ‘constructive notice,’ a legal concept meaning that
members of the public are deemed to have knowledge of the facts stated in the document and
cannot claim otherwise.”).
153 See id. § 106A(b) (providing moral rights only to the aggrieved artist).
154 Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 9 (2016),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_909_2016.pdf (“Copyright protects
two types of rights. Economic rights allow right owners to derive financial reward from the
use of their works by others. Moral rights allow authors and creators to take certain actions to
preserve and protect their link with their work. The author or creator may be the owner of the
economic rights or those rights may be transferred to one or more copyright owners. Many
countries do not allow the transfer of moral rights.”).
155 Netanel, supra note 132, at 1.
156 Id. at 38 (“A purchaser of a work of art, or publisher or producer, thus acquires the work
or right to exploit a work subject to a duty to respect and possibly to promote the author’s
artistic expression.”).
157 Marian Nash (Leich), CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981–1988, at 2819 (detailing that “Article 5(2) requires automatic
protection, that is, the enjoyment and exercise of rights may not be conditioned on the
observance of any formality whatsoever.”).
151
152
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whether they took any formal steps to legitimize their work of art with their
government.158 Previously existing United States copyright law requires a party
to have already applied for registration of their copyright before bringing an
infringement suit.159 With the adoption of VARA, this statute was amended to
provide an exception to the long-standing requirement of registration for the
moral rights of integrity and attribution.160
As it stands, the United States has placed overwhelming emphasis on the
importance of moral rights that poses constitutional concerns regarding due
process and, when applied to creative destruction, the freedom of expression.
This is furthered by the fact that VARA only provides moral rights protection
for visual artists.161
Another concern lies in the outright creation of rights themselves. This is
based on an understanding that once rights are conferred, legal safeguards act to
protect a citizen against unwarranted government intrusion of those rights.162 As
a result, it is understandable that an unlimited right of integrity would strike fear
into the heart of any consumer-oriented market.
Before VARA’s enactment, it was determined that the United States’ preexisting legal framework provided adequate protection to meet Berne
convention requirements.163 As shown below, contract, property, trademark, and
copyright law predating VARA and the Convention provide ample protections
for moral right concerns. Before the codification of these rights, the notions of
attribution and integrity were not egregiously threatened.
III. ANALYSIS
A. WITH NO FOUNDATION THE HOUSE WILL FALL

Moral rights are without a common law foundation and do not sufficiently
reflect United States society. While the United States was in its artistic infancy in
the 18th and 19th centuries, upper and middle-class Europeans spent much of
their leisure time enjoying, promoting, and purchasing art and music.164 Thus,
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 411.
160 17 U.S.C. § 412 (providing an exception to certain remedies, specifically “[i]n any action
under this title, other than an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under section
106A(a).”) (emphasis added).
161 This is notable considering the Berne Convention specifically intended protection to both
Visual and Literary works.
162 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV.
343, 356 (1993) (discussing the limitations on the government’s power regarding individual
rights).
163 Netanel, supra note 132, at 25.
164 Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit
Moral between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 381–82 (1997-1998).
158
159
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the foundation of moral rights emerged out of centuries of artwork and its crucial
role in society.165 While this criticism is surely not the straw that breaks the camel’s
back, it shows policy considerations in opposition to the right of integrity.
In addition to analyzing the United States and French Art History, this section
further shows strong policy considerations in favor of protecting an artist’s right
to creative destruction. Current art movements trend towards contemporary and
performance art.166 This art can employ destruction, and its symbolism can
convey a variety of expressive ideas that are protected by law. As a result, a
previous artist’s right to integrity currently threatens this unique form of
creativity and unearths various constitutional concerns.
1. A Quick Art History Lesson.
In its formative years, it makes sense that the newly formed American society
would push back against any tradition reminiscent of their colonial rulers. In light
of these ideological differences, one must not assume that what works in Europe
can be instantly applied to America. The intent of a right of integrity is noble,
but its execution pales in comparison to its European counterparts. The United
States simply does not have the requisite social, cultural, or legal framework to
suddenly establish blanket protection over any instance of visual creativity.
United States art has its origins in both European and Native American
traditions.167 Early colonial art mainly relied on artists from Europe and
specialized in portraiture and landscapes.168 In 1820, the United States developed
a distinct artistic movement termed the Hudson River School.169 This movement
focused on romantic landscape paintings and patriotic art. A notorious example
of Hudson River School Art is the painting of George Washington Crossing of
the Delaware River.170 Additionally, this period saw the growth of the rural
American craft movement.171 This artwork was reactionary against the industrial
revolution and typically hand made.172

Id.
Alina Cohen, Our Prediction for Art in the 2020s, ARTSY (Dec. 20, 2019)
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-art-2020s.
167 Charlotte Jirousek, The Development of Modern Art in the US, ART, DESIGN, AND VISUAL
THINKING,
http://char.txa.cornell.edu/ART/FINEART/MODERNUS/modernus.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
168 David Jaffee, Art and Identity in British North American Colonies, 1700-1776, METRO. MUSEUM
OF ART (Oct. 2004), https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/arid/hd_arid.htm.
169 Jirousek, supra note 167.
170 Emanuel Leutze, Washington Crossing the Delaware, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART,
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/11417 (last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
171 Monica Obniski, The Arts and Crafts Movement in America, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART (June
2008), https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/acam/hd_acam.htm.
172 Id.
165
166
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Next, the 1850s brought a style produced under the influence of Europe,
specifically the standards of the French Académie des Beaux-Arts.173 As
discussed later in the section on trademark protection, the period of Academism
in Europe, specifically, France, distinguishes art as a professional trade. At this
time, artists attended fine art schools, most notably the Académie des BeauxArts in France.174 American artists flocked to Europe in hopes of learning from
and competing with the global powers in the art arena.175
After World War II, United States art reflected the disillusionment of society
with the Abstract Expressionist movement.176 This period saw the likes of
Willem de Kooning,177 the creative destruction king himself, and Jackson
Pollack178—famous for his innovative paint-splattering technique. Alongside
Abstract Expressionism, post-war America birthed movements of the New York
School,179 Pop Art,180 Op-Art,181 Minimalism,182 and Conceptual Art—discussed
below.
H. Barbara Weinberg, Nineteenth Century American Painters at the École Des Beaux-Arts, 13(4)
AM. ART J. 66, 66 (1981).
174 See id. (describing the École as “an essential training ground for American painters”).
175 Id.
176 See generally, Gregory Gilbert, Robert Motherwell’s World War Two Collages: Signifying War as
Topical Spectacle in Abstract Expressionist Art, 27(3) OX. ART J. 311, 313–14 (2004).
177 Willem de Kooning, MUSEUM MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/artists/3213?locale=en
(last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
178
Jackson
Pollack,
MUSEUM
MOD.
ART,
https://www.moma.org/artists/4675?=undefined&page=2&direction=fwd (last visited Oct.
20, 2021).
179 Jirousek, supra note 167. Artists from the New York School include Rothko, Gottlieb, and
Motherwell. New York School, TATE, https://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/n/new-yorkschool
(last
visited
Nov.
20,
2021);
Mark
Rothko,
MOMA,
https://www.moma.org/artists/5047 (last visited Nov. 13, 2021); Adolph Gottlieb,
GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/artist/adolph-gottlieb (last visited
Nov. 13, 2021); Robert Motherwell, MOMA, https://www.moma.org/artists/4126 (last visited
Nov. 13, 2021).
180 Jirousek, supra note 167. Artists from the Pop Art movement include Andy Warhol, Roy
Lichtenstein, Claes Oldenburg, Morris Lewis, and Jasper Johns. Andy Warhol, MOMA
https://www.moma.org/artists/6246 (last visited Nov. 13, 2021); Roy Lichtenstein, MOMA,
https://www.moma.org/artists/3542 (last visited Nov. 13, 2021); Claus Oldenberg,
GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/artist/claes-oldenburg (last visited
Nov. 13, 2021) ; Morris Lewis, MD. INST. C. ART, https://morrislouis.org/ (last visited Nov.
13,
2021);
Jasper
Johns:
Mind/Mirror,
WHITNEY MUSEUM MOD. ART,
https://whitney.org/exhibitions/jasper-johns (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
181 Jirousek, supra note 167. Artists from the Op-Art movement include Bridget Riley and
Victor Vasalarely. Bridget Riley, TATE, https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/bridget-riley-1845
(last
visited
Nov.
13,
2021);
Victor
Vasalarely,
GUGGENHEIM,
https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/artist/victor-vasarely (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
182 Jirousek, supra note 167. Artists from Minimalism include Ellsworth Kelly, Robert
Grosvenor, Isamu Noguchi, Frank Stella. Alex Palmer, Why Ellsworth Kelly Was a Giant in
173
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Europe similarly experienced artistic disillusion after World War II.183 For
instance, British artist Michael Landy destroyed “art he owned, paintings by
friends like Gary Hume—who at first was horrified but then saw the point and
went along with it.”184 Further, Pierre Pinonchelli in France was put on trial for
smashing a urinal that was a copy the Fountain, by Marcel Duchamp.185
Pinonchelli is quoted as saying, “I had killed the urinal. It was nothing more than
a serialized object, without a past, no scars, all smooth.”186
As demonstrated by Pinonchelli, destructive art is a prominent and
emerging form of creativity and that deserves recognition. Destruction allows
one to expressively and dramatically show their viewpoint as Pinoncelli did with
the Fountain and places a piece of work in an entirely different light.
2. 21st Century Art Movements.
Conceptual art began in the 1920s but has resurfaced in recent modern art
movements. Traditional conceptual art is called Dadaism and described as
“attack[ing] the sacredness and permanence of the artwork itself, claiming that
the art is in the idea and that once the concept has been expressed, the object is
unimportant.”187 An essential notion behind conceptual art is the discussion and
conversation an artist has with a viewer.188 The artist attempts to provide the
viewer with the elements required to understand the artists’ viewpoint at that
moment.189
Take, for example, the artist Banksy. Most recently, Banksy produced a piece
of work that was destroyed upon sale at auction.190 Unexpectedly, and ironically,
the piece malfunctioned and only partially destroyed the art, leaving the rest

the World of American Art, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 28, 2015)
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/why-ellsworth-kelly-was-giant-worldCOOPER
GALLERY,
american-art-180957652/;
Robert
Grosvenor,
PAULA
https://www.paulacoopergallery.com/artists/robert-grosvenor#tab:thumbnails (last visited
Nov.
13,
2021);
Who
is
Frank
Stella?,
TATE
KIDS
https://www.tate.org.uk/kids/explore/who-is/who-frank-stella (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
183 Alina Cohen, Our Prediction for Art in the 2020s, ARTSY (December 20, 2019, 10:27 AM),
https://www.artsy.net/series/decade-art/artsy-editorial-art-2020s.
184 Lawrence Pollard, Destroying Art for Art’s Sake, BBC (Oct. 27, 2009, 8:13 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/entertainment/8325665.stm.
185 Id.
186
Pierre Doze, Pierre Pinonchelli: He’s 77 & Back, ISSUE MAGAZINE,
https://issuemagazine.com/pierre-pinoncelli-hes-77-and-back/#/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
187 Jirousek, supra note 167.
188 MoMa Learning, MOMA https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/themes/mediaand-performance-art/participation-and-audience-involvement/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
189 Id.
190 Preminda Jacob, Banksy and the Tradition of Destroying Art, CNN STYLE (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/style/article/banksy-tradition-of-destroying-art/index.html.
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hanging in strings under the frame, half-shredded.191 This is ironic because
Banksy had intended the piece to destroy as a demonstration of materialism and
criticism of the wealthy. As a result of its half-shredded state, the artwork’s value
increased dramatically, thus thwarting Banksy’s intent.192
Banksy’s piece exemplifies the use of destruction in an artist’s creative
expression. The entire purpose of the piece hinged on its destruction, and
without it, the work ceases to express the conversation and ideas as intended.
Further, Banksy is not a stand-alone artist. Many other lesser-known artists seek
similar artistic dialogue.193
The 21st century is in its artistic infancy, but scholars have interesting
predictions regarding what the new century will bring creatively. Most notably,
there is a strong belief that “the pendulum will swing back to abstraction.”194
Additionally, the emphasis on 19th and early 20th century French art will transfer
to a focus on more international perspectives.195
For example, when the Museum of Modern Art opened a new collection,
they “paired Faith Ringgold’s apocalyptic painting of race and violence in
America . . . with Pablo Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907).”196 The
pairing allowed viewers to connect Picasso’s fractured planes with Ringgold’s
image of a shattered society.197 The decision to curate two distinct works to
create a social dialogue between the two exemplifies the Contemporary Art
movement.
B. AMPLE PROTECTION AFFORDED

1. Trademark Protection.
Protection under the Lanham Act takes into account the interests of the
consumer unlike VARA’s sole emphasis on the artist. The standard of protection
under the Lanham Act protects against consumer confusion when there is a
“sufficient similarity between the products to scrutinize the evidence for proof
of confusion,” for protection of stylistic similarity.198 This standard “requires a
showing of a ‘likelihood of confusion’ by a reasonably prudent buyer.”199
Scott Reyburn, Banksy Painting Self-Destructs After Fetching $1.4 Million at Sotheby’s, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 6, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/arts/design/uk-banksy-paintingsothebys.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
192 Id.
193 See Timothy Bogatz, 12 Street Artists (Not Named Banksy) Your Students Should Know, ART
EDUC. U. (2018) (listing twelve additional modern street artists).
194 Cohen, supra note 166.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (1992).
199 Christina Saunders, Incidental and Intentional Uses of Trademarks and Service Marks in Artwork,
41-SEP COLO. LAW. 51, 51– 52 (2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)).
191
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Further, courts applying this standard utilize “an expansive interpretation” in
determining whether confusion has occurred.200 Essentially, under this standard,
an artist’s right of attribution is already protected against any subsequent owner
artist who wishes to creatively destroy their work. If the modified work is
substantially similar to the original piece, an artist may have a cause of action
under the Lanham Act.201
2. Protection under Contract.
Traditionally, the sale of intellectual property was governed by contract law,
altered by “the special nature of a contract for artistic . . . property.”202 Regardless
of any imbalance in bargaining power, anyone can create a contract for their
services; in fact, contracts for the sale of goods are standard in commercial
transactions, and as mentioned above are largely governed by the U.C.C.203 If the
sale of art at its core is a commercial transaction, then why is it necessary to
bestow additional rights simply upon creation of “art?”204
A common argument is that the destruction of work destroys some intrinsic
right in the creator and that the harm incurred by an artist when their work is
destroyed outweighs an owner’s absolute rights.205 Two instances in case law
where a breach of contract failed to adequately protect an artists’ work represent
examples of sub-par lawyering on the part of an artist representing themselves
pro se, or inadequate legal representation.206 In the first instance, Vargas v. Esquire
Magazine, Inc., the plaintiff, a fifty-one-year-old artist from Peru who resided in
the United States for thirty-two years, brought suit against the defendant alleging
breach of contract through fraud and misrepresentation.207

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n., 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1993).
See Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002) (considering
the following factors in determining substantial similarity: “(1) the degree of similarity between
the marks; (2) the intent of the alleged infringer in using the mark; (3) evidence of actual
consumer confusion; (4) the similarity of products and manner of marketing; (5) the degree of
care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the strength or weakness of the marks.”).
202 Swack, supra note 164, at 380.
203 Note, this is the Uniform Commercial Code and not the Universal Copyright Convention.
204 I put “art” in quotation marks here because at its core, art is subjective. There is no standard
for defining what is and what is not art, creating a grave potential for the over-protection of
art in the name of moral rights, and ultimately, a restriction of the very creativity copyright law
wishes to encourage. Further, as mentioned above in my discussion of the Erased de Kooning,
the artistic process is equally as important as the work itself and serves as an important tool for
development of technique and artistic movements.
205 Swack, supra note 164, at 369.
206 Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1948); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church
in City of New York, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
207 Vargas, 166 F.2d at 652–53.
200
201
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There, the case turned on “whether the contract [was] void because plaintiff
failed to know what it contained.”208 This a common argument to void a
contract; however, as the court explained in Vargas, contracts are to be construed
from their plain language unless there is ambiguity.209 Absent ambiguity, parties
to a contract are bound to its plain language unless there is proof of fraud or
other malice.210 Ultimately, the plaintiff-artist’s claim failed because the contract
was “written in plain and ordinary language and is readily understandable.”211
Vargas is a clear example of inadequate drafting resulting in harm to an artist’s
interest.
Another case from New York details a similar failure to properly contract.212
There, a Church hosted a competition where twenty artists competed for the
opportunity to have their artwork implemented as a fresco mural for the
Church.213 The plaintiff-artist brought suit when the church redecorated and
painted over his mural without notice 10 years later.214 Ultimately, the church
was the proper owner of the artwork through both contract and copyright.215
As a result, the court held “the claim . . . that an artist retains rights in his
work after it has been unconditionally sold where such rights are related to the
protection of his artistic reputation, [was] not supported by the decisions of our
courts.”216 Similar to Vargas, the plaintiff-artist here failed in the contract to
adequately protect his interests. Under the law of contracts, mistakes generally
cannot be judicially remedied simply because the party is not satisfied with its
outcome.217 The two artists here were deprived of legal recourse not because it
did not exist, but because the party, or their lawyer, failed to protect their interests
through contract drafting.218
The most surefire way to protect one’s art is by having the purchaser sign a
contract stating they will not destroy the art in the future. Not only does this

Id. at 654.
Id. Ambiguity may be resolved through parol evidence; however, facts here did not warrant
an inquiry into ambiguity.
210
72. Principles of Contract Interpretation, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE (Sept. 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-72-principles-contract-interpretation.
211 Id.
212 Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 815.
215 Id. at 819.
216 Id.
217 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 64 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(stating the general rule that “[r]elief can only follow if the mistake was mutual, if it related to
a basic assumption underlying the contract, and if it caused a severe imbalance in the agreed
exchange.”).
218 See Swack, supra 164, at 384 (discussing the two cases wherein the parties signed a standard
contract form rather than a contract individualized and negotiated to suit their specific needs).
208
209
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provide adequate notice to the purchaser, but contracts are available to every
individual regardless of differences in bargaining power.
3. Tort Action.
Additional protection can be found through the general tort of defamation.
Defamation is a general tort that allows actions for the protection of one’s
reputation.219 Defamation can remedy an injury caused by either publishing a
severely altered rendition of the work under the artist’s name or falsely attributing
authorship to the artist of a poor-quality product reproduced from their work
without knowledge or assistance.220
A common argument against defamation as adequate protection is the
requirement of proof of damages for an artist to recover.221 That is, harm to
one’s reputation is quite difficult to meet the “injury” requirement, akin to that
of federal standing.222 This argument is poorly based since it seems to believe
that proof of an injury is a factor that should not be required to bring a case in
court under other legal actions. Standing requires the presence of a concrete and
particularized injury that is also actual or imminent.223 Absent injury, an
individual cannot prove standing, cannot sustain their case in court.224
C. DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

From the artist’s perspective, it seems the scales of justice are tipped in their
favor. This is understandable in Europe, but not so much in the United States.
The United States places much more emphasis on the value of the consumer and
their economic rights in commercial transactions.225

See Defamation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term as “[m]alicious
or groundless harm to the reputation or good name of another by the making of a false
statement to a third person.”).
220 Swack, supra note 164, at 361.
221 See, e.g., Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (“Generally, a plaintiff in a defamation action must prove special damages, which consist
of ‘the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value, which must flow directly from
the injury to reputation caused by the defamation and not from the effects of the
defamation.’”)(quoting Nunez v. A–T Fin. Info., Inc., 957 F.Supp. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
222 See 35. Standing to Sue, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resourcemanual-35-standing-sue (last visited Nov. 19, 2021) (explaining the general requirements for
standing).
223 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
224 Id. at 560 (“Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are
part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”).
225 Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION. https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
219
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Given the Court’s concern with balancing interests and ensuring an
opportunity for fair and just proceedings, VARA violates a subsequent ownerartist’s right to Due Process. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide
that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process
of the law.”226 VARA violates this right by depriving a subsequent artist-owner
of their creative and property interests as guaranteed by procedural due process
and the right to adequate notice.
Traditionally, the due process clause is understood to minimally provide
procedural and substantive protections against the government’s deprivation of
an individual’s rights to life, liberty, or property. Specifically, due process
provides two procedural requirements: adequate notice, and an opportunity to
be heard before an impartial tribunal before such deprivation of life, liberty, or
property.227
Courts analyze due process claims through the balancing test outlined in
Mathews v. Eldridge.228 This test balances the relevant interests involved including,
(1) the private interest at stake in the administrative action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of this interest through procedures used, and the value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest,
including the function involved and burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.229
VARA allows for civil action without notice to the subsequent owner.
Subsection (b) states that “[o]nly the author of a work of visual art has the rights
. . . [of attribution and integrity] . . . , whether or not the author is the copyright
owner.”230 Further, § 411(a) of the Copyright Act states that “[e]xcept for an
action brought . . . under section 106A(a) . . . [,] no civil action for infringement
of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration
or registration of the copyright claim has been made.”231 The statute explicitly
exempts VARA from the requirement of registration before obtaining an award
from the court.232
This is directly shown through Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., in which the
Second Circuit explained that “[c]opyright registration is not required to bring an
action for infringement of the rights granted under VARA, or to secure statutory
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
See Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)(stating that the “right
to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may
not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our
society.”); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 (2002)(quoting United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)which held that an individual whose
property interests were at stake is entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).
228 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1975).
229 Id.
230 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
231 Id. § 411(a).
232 Id.
226
227
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damages and attorney's fees.”233 Without registration, the ability of a subsequent
owner to accurately ascertain their liability is greatly diminished. A flea-market
art-find could result in a lawsuit under VARA without none the wiser. Thus,
VARA’s exclusion of registration could become a constitutional impediment to
a subsequent owner’s due process.
Further, the exemption of registration means that these rights are given to
any person who wishes to create visual art.234 This does not create protection
specifically for professional artists, but for art in totality. If an artist wants to
protect their work, they should go through proper procedural steps to do so and
treat the purported sanctity of their work as it deserves.
In other words, there are certain requirements to be a professional in many
different trades, why should artistry be any different? Professional artistry finds
its roots in the guild system, similar to other professional trades.235 A prospective
artist generally starts as an apprentice working under a professional in hopes of
becoming a master artist through training.236 At that point, I believe, the master
artist may be granted the protection afforded by the right of integrity, for their
work will be sufficiently distinct as to provide notice to any subsequent artistowner who may wish to employ creative destruction techniques. Further, the
burden of supplying notice would be minimal compared with such deprivation.
The lack of adequate procedural requirements for VARA protection poses
serious threats to a subsequent owner’s due process. Without notice, an artist
interested in creative destruction is unduly burdened with potential VARA
liability.
D. INTEGRITY EXCEEDS THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER

Congress is granted the power under the Patent and Copyright Clause to
“promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts.”237 Current American
movements in art support the conclusion that destruction is a necessary
component of artistic and creative progression, both personally for an artist and
culturally for the nation as a whole.238 The right of integrity threatens this artistic
process regarded by some as important as the creation of art itself. As a result,

71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing, 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412).
17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
235 Mark Cartwright, Medieval Guilds, World Hist. Encyclopedia (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.worldhistory.org/Medieval_Guilds/.
236
Training
and
Practice,
ITALIAN RENAISSANCE LEARNING RESOURCES,
http://www.italianrenaissanceresources.com/units/unit-3/essays/training-and-practice/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
237 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
238 See Why is Contemporary Art Important?, IESA, https://www.iesa.edu/paris/newsevents/contemporary-art-importance (discussing various reasons why contemporary art is
important).
233
234
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integrity exceeds the scope of authority afforded to Congress by the plain text of
the Constitution.
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “to promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”239 At issue here is the interpretation of the term “promote” and
the context with which Congress is to “promote the Progress of...the useful
Arts.”240
First, the term “promote” is not ambiguous. Its plain-language meaning is “to
contribute to the growth or prosperity of” as defined by Merriam Webster’s
dictionary.241 Further, texts discussing the Clause’s development suggest that the
Framers “did not wish to vest in Congress plenary powers over patents and
copyrights, but rather wanted to” externally limit the exercise of Congressional
powers to the ends of promoting progress.242 This means that the Clause itself is
not a positive grant of power, but a limitation on power Congress might seek to
exert so as not to hamper the promotion of the progress of useful sciences and
art.
Resulting from this understanding, the right of integrity acts to chill the
creative process. As discussed in Section II.a.1., destruction holds a niche, but
important, presence in art and creativity. Just as the creation of an initial piece of
art should be protected, the later creative destruction of the same piece should
likewise be protected—regardless of whether the destructor is the original artist
or a subsequent owner. The right of integrity acts as a threat to any artist wishing
to explore creativity through destruction. Consequently, this right also acts as a
deterrent to creativity and is therefore plainly outside of the scope of powers
conferred under Article I of the Constitution.
E. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS

A final criticism regarding the right of integrity lies in its First Amendment
implications. As discussed above, integrity has the potential to deter creative
destruction and is outside of the goals enumerated in the Copyright Clause. As a
result, this deterrence of creative destruction can potentially chill one’s rights as
granted by the First Amendment.

Id.
Id.
241 Promote, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/promote
(last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
242 Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress As A Limitation
on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1811 (2006).
239
240
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A court’s analysis of First Amendment claims depends on whether the
regulation at issue is content-based or content-neutral.243 Here, the regulation is
facially content-neutral and would be subjected to an intermediate scrutiny
inquiry by the court.244 Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to make
showings that (1) the law is narrowly tailored, (2) the law serves a substantial
government interest, and (3) that it leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication.245 Under this inquiry, the right of integrity violates the First
Amendment by unduly restricting one’s right to free expression through
destruction.
In an intermediate scrutiny inquiry, the analysis hinges on two elements: the
narrow tailoring of means to ends and the presence of substantial government
interest.246 The government interest here is the promotion of artistic progress
and protection of the artist's interests. Other interests at play concern the context
of United States participation in the Berne Convention, such as security of
protection for other forms of intellectual property of more national concern.
As established above, the government’s means of protecting artist’s interests
are not narrowly tailored to its ends as intended by the Copyright Clause. A
narrowly tailored regulation would have employed a balancing of interests and
would reflect the art history and current art culture of its society. Destruction
plays an important role in both performance art and transformative works, and
it helps to communicate an artist’s criticism of society, politics, cultural norms,
and artistic movements as a whole.
The final inquiry of intermediate scrutiny is whether the government has left
open ample alternative channels of communication.247 In theory, this objective
is achieved. An artist who wishes to partake in creative destruction can seek
consent from the original artist like Robert Rauschenberg.248 However, the
balance of power against a lesser-known artist can act as an obstacle for such

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that a government may
impose reasonable restrictions on speech “provided the restrictions ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.’”) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non–Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
244 Id. (describing intermediate scrutiny).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984)
(“While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable
method of communication at all times and in all places . . . a restriction on expressive activity
may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.”) (internal citation
omitted).
248 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (stating that “rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to
such waiver in a written instrument signed by the author.”).
243

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

33

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5

172

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:1

consent. As a result, this final inquiry is likely satisfied as it leaves alternative
channels of communication; issues arise, however, when artists attempt creative
destruction on the work without knowledge of such consent requirement.
This brings to light the implications brought by a special type of regulation,
termed a “total medium ban,” in which a specific type of communication is
completely prohibited by law.249 One can argue that the right of integrity consists
of a total medium ban against creative destruction. These types of bans are
disfavored by the Supreme Court as they limit speech by “suppress[ing] too
much speech.”250
In brief, the right of integrity has the potential to unduly restrict one’s right
to free expression through destruction. It may even follow that integrity could
pose a total medium ban on such expression. This grave issue can be remedied
by the protection of creative destruction as a respected component of creativity
and art as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
While attribution has an important place in law,251 its counterpart, integrity,
is a frivolous expansion of copyright law that infringes on absolute ownership
traditions. Europe has a longstanding history and connection with art. This
cultural connection created years of case law studying the specific issue of an
artist’s integrity. In contrast, the United States has only a few niche cases
scattered among the lower courts.252
Of course, there are certain restrictions to destruction, like protection given
to historical landmarks,253 but for the most part, an owner is conferred absolute
ownership in their personal property. VARA takes this tradition and egregiously
threatens the ability of an owner to exercise their rights of absolute ownership.
Absent expansive case law detailing why the United States would need this
protection, its outright and blanket conferral seems reckless and ill-conceived.
This is furthered by the fact that VARA was rushed through the procedural
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
See id. (“Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content
or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily
apparent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too
much speech.”).
251 PROWDA ET AL., supra note 112, at 102 (“The European Commission (EC) has stated that
moral rights protect consumers by verifying that works are authentic . . . (i.e. there is economic
value in the right of paternity)”.).
252 See, e.g., Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 630 (S.D. Ind. 1997), Lubner v. City
of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. App. 4th 525, 528 (1996) (representing the small pool of cases
specifically concerned with both destruction and the right of integrity).
253 Art Preservation Act, Cultural and Artistic Preservation Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 987, 989
(West 1994).
249
250
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process as a bill and was tacked onto the back of the confirmation federal
judgeships.254
Moving forward, the solutions are to either entirely repeal VARA or to create
an exception to the right of integrity for creative destruction for the purposes
tailored to evolving artwork and fostering creativity. This exception must take
into account the difference between creative and alternate forms of destruction.
I believe this inquiry should turn on the intention and purposes of destruction
rather than the subjective opinion of the artist.255
Further, VARA creates inequality in artistic commerce in favor of the original
artist while failing to protect any subsequent artist-owner. VARA also imposes
liability on any subsequent artist-owner who may wish to creatively manipulate
their lawfully owned property. This directly opposes the United States’
longstanding protection of consumers and owners. Finally, VARA is a threat to
creativity and the natural cycle that is a work of art. If one is never given the
ability to improve on past developments, whether art, philosophy, literature, etc.,
then there would be a stagnation of creativity.
One might argue that the right of integrity protects works significant to the
development of the useful arts and sciences.256 I reply, however, that creative
destruction can be distinguished from the protection of historical artwork under
preservation statutes. The artist in question here is under the assumption that the
work of art purchased is not a historical or protected work of art. As a result, they
would have no idea, or notice, of the potential for legal liability conditioned upon
its destruction.
The United States has a deeply rich and unique culture, both in art and history,
concerning insurgency and rebirth from destruction. As shown through the
arguments above, a traditional balancing of interests shows a discrepancy to
account for such history and the potential ramifications that a right of integrity
may pose to the progression of American art. Additionally, the government
interests asserted here are neither substantial nor significant enough to
overpower the concern and protection of freedom of expression. The right of
integrity also directly conflicts with the promotional power conferred to
Congress by the Copyright Clause and raises procedural concerns under the Due
Process Clause. This threatens a subsequent owner-artist’s Due Process rights
under the Fifth Amendment by providing for legal recourse without adequate
notice of one’s liability.

See Christopher J. Robinson, Note, The "Recognized Stature" Standard in the Visual Artists Rights
Act, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1935, 1935–36 (2000) (describing VARA’s hurried passage into law).
255 Or at the very least, the statute should provide the minimal procedural requirements of the
Fifth Amendment.
256 See Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity
Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297 (2002-2003) (advocating in favor of moral rights).
254
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To preserve the integrity of the Copyright Clause, I propose an amendment
of VARA to specifically afford protection to destructive processes that further
artistic progress and development. In the absence of such an amendment, I
implore the judiciary to take a narrow approach in interpreting the right of
integrity and to employ a balanced analysis that accounts for all material interests
present. Finally, and most importantly, there is an immediate need to integrate a
requirement of notice. This would aid a subsequent owner-artist in
comprehending their full scope of legal liability when deciding to partake in
creative destruction.
Moving forward, I urge Congress to first and foremost consider the entire
breadth of an artist’s rights under the Constitution. Since any regulation of art
threatens First Amendment rights, Congress must delicately navigate such issues
to both promote progress and protect individual rights. When crafting such
legislation, Congress must consider a national approach and take into account
American ideals over any international influences. While the right of attribution
is a step forward in protecting creative processes, the right of integrity threatens
to chill creative destruction.
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